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CASE NOTES ILI
wording of the Federal Tort Claims Act would have resulted in preclusion
of the defense of contributory negligence. The court, however, felt that a
situation where a municipal corporation would take advantage of the Act
to sue the United States and then raise a shield of municipal immunity
could not have been within the contemplation of Congress when the Act
was passed.
In doing so, it followed the general philosophy of construing the
statute as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Feres v. United
States:
This Act, however, should be construed to fit, so far as will comport with
its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies against the Government
to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole. 15
15 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
LABOR LAW-REFUSAL TO HANDLE GOODS UNDER
"HOT CARGO" CLAUSE HELD NO DEFENSE TO
CHARGE OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The Sand Door Company sold doors to a millwork contractor who de-
livered them to the site of a hospital construction project in Southern
California. The general contractor was a party to a master labor agree-
ment, which included its carpenters, and which stated, "workmen shall not
be required to handle non-union materials." The carpenters were installing
the doors when the business agent of Local 1976, International Brother-
hood of Carpenters, notified the foreman that the doors were non-union
and could not be hung. The foreman thereupon ordered his men to cease
work. Subsequent negotiations failed to produce an agreement that would
allow the doors to be installed. The Sand Door Company petitioned the
NLRB1 which ruled that the action of the business agent was a violation
of Section 8 (b) (4) (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 This section provides,
in substance, that it is an unfair labor practice to induce employees of a
secondary employer to cease handling goods of a primary employer in
1 Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and Sand
Door and Plywood Co., 113 NLRB 1210 (1955).
2 National Labor Relations Act, Section 8(b) (4) (a) as amended by Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. S 158 (b) (4) (a) (1956).
Section 8 (b) provides that, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion or its agents... (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof
is: (a) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ......
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order to force the secondary employer to cease buying, transporting, or
doing business with the primary employer. The Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, enforced the cease and desist order. Certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court and the judgment of the NLRB was
enforced. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 78 S.
Ct. 1011 (1958).
Local 1976 contended that their action was proper on the basis of a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement, viz.: "workmen shall
not be required to handle non-union material." Such provisions are called
"hot cargo" clauses and usually provide that an employee cannot be made
to handle items that are not manufactured by union employees, or if
union-made are not transported, handled or stored by union employees.
The basic issue before the Supreme Court was: can a "hot cargo" pro-
vision, such as is found in the collective bargaining agreement in this case,
be a defense to a charge of an unfair labor practice under Section
8(b) (4) (a) when in the absence of such a provision, the union conduct
would unquestionably be a violation? This question first appeared before
the NLRB some nine years ago in In re International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and Rabouin Doing Business as Conway's Express.13 In that
case, the employer, a common carrier, leased some of his equipment to
another firm, which used non-union drivers to move it. The union struck
at the employer's principal terminal and further induced employees at
three other firms doing business with the employer not to handle his
material. The employer claimed that this violated Section 8(b)(4)(a) of
the Act. But the NLRB and the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, concurred in the opinion that the acts of the union were not
violative of the section because of the "hot cargo" clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. In effect the Court held that "hot cargo" clauses
in a collective bargaining agreement constituted a defense to charges of
violations of Section 8(b)(4)(a) when negotiated prior to the refusals
and when acquiesced to by both parties.
In 1953, in the case of Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen, and
Helpers Local Union No. 135 and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,4 the union
told employees not to handle "unfair goods" as provided in the labor
contract. The NLRB decided that the union did not violate Section
8(b) (4) (a). Thus, the Board adhered to the ruling in the Conway case.
In the case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 554
and McAllister Transfer, Inc.,5 decided in 1954, the pendulum swung the
87 NLRB 972 (1949), affirmed sub nom, Rabouin v. National Labor Relations Board,
195 F.2d 906 (CA. 2d, 1952).
4 105 NLRB 740 (1953).
5 110 NLRB 1769 (1954).
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other way and the court declared that all secondary boycotts, whether
accomplished under a "hot cargo" clause in a contract or not, were un-
lawful as violative of Section 8(b)(4)(a). In this case an organizer of a
teamsters local approached the general manager of McAllister Transfer.
The organizer made clear that his union would refuse to handle the com-
pany's freight if it remained non-union. Much of McAllister's business
was interlined at terminals operated by other trucking firms who were all
in the same business and who were parties to a labor agreement which
contained a "hot cargo" clause.
A few days after the organizer's visit, employees of the interlining ter-
minals refused to accept shipment for McAllister because they were "not
obligated to handle unfair merchandise." Prior to these employee refusals,
a union meeting was held in which the desirability of organizing non-
union operations was stressed. Members were advised that it was within
their rights to refuse to move "unfair goods." As a result of the employee
refusals, the interlining firm posted a notice to its employees directing
them to handle all freight entering the terminal. But, the employees did
not comply and no disciplinary action was taken. Similar incidents oc-
curred at the other interlining terminals and finally an injunction was
issued restraining the boycott. The case was brought to the NLRB where
the union interposed the defense of the "hot cargo" provision.
The Board, in refusing the contract as a defense, based its decision
primarily on public policy saying that the statutory protection of the
public interest cannot be waived by the agreement of the parties. The
Board also discussed the legislative intent, stating that the policy of the
Board at the time the 1947 amendments to the act were adopted was clear-
ly and unmistakably against giving effect to contracts which thwarted
the broad effects of the Act.
The Board finally and unequivocally stated:
No amount of ingenuity, it seems to us, can change the simple fact that a,
"hot cargo" contract is nothing more than device to immunize in advance
the very conduct which Congress in response to a dire public need sought ef-
fectively to eliminate. To permit a form of legal sophistry to make possible so
flagrant a subterfuge for continuing this well-known abuse in labor disputes is
to make a mockery of one of the most significant provisions which Congress
wrote into the Act.6
The Board in the intant case held that the union's conduct was clearly
a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (a) not in regard to the mere insertion of
a "hot cargo" clause, but in so far as there was a direct appeal to the
employees not to handle "unfair goods" even though the "hot cargo"
clause apparently gives such a right. The Supreme Court in upholding
the decision stated conclusively that a "hot cargo" provision in a collec-
6 Ibid., at 1784.
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tive bargaining agreement is not a defense to a charge of unfair labor
practices, where in the absence of the "hot cargo" provision, the union
conduct would unquestionably be a violation. Thus, inducement of em-
ployees which is prohibited under Section 8(b)(4)(a) in the absence of
a "hot cargo" provision, is likewise prohibited when there is such a pro-
vision.7
From the foregoing cases, a gradual evolution of the definitive meaning
of Section 8 (b) (4) (a) is seen. In the Conway case, it was felt that "hot
cargo" contracts were fully within the law and were to be honored. The
McAllister decision represented a complete reversal calling for an over-
ruling of the Conway case and a declaration that a "hot cargo" provision
is not a defense to a charge under Section 8 (b) (4) (a). In the Sand Door
case, the Board changed its mind again by declaring the contract to be
lawful, and only the appeal to employees unlawful.
Finally, the Supreme Court decided in affirmation of the Sand Door
case that any appeal to the employees is a violation of Section 8 (b) (4)
(a).
In addition, it held that, in spite of a contract, the employer is always
free to make his own choice of dealing with, or refusing to deal with
another concern at the time the question of boycott arises, thus giving
the contract an almost nugatory effect.
7 Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 78 S.Ct. 1011 (1958).
LEGAL ETHICS-OPERATIONS OF UNION LEGAL
AID DEPARTMENT HELD ILLEGAL
AND UNPROFESSIONAL
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and their regional counsel
entered into an agreement whereby fees for claims, arising out of injuries
to employees sustained in railroad accidents, were set at a fixed percent-
age, and any investigation costs, expert witness fees, medical examinations,
transcript costs, and printing of appellate briefs, and department's oper-
ating costs were to be paid by the attorney out of the fixed percentage.'
The investigation costs included a payment to an agent appointed by the
union, whose responsibility it was to complete accident reports on all
injuries occurring to employees in the course of employment. It was the
agent's duty to contact the injured party, or his family, promulgating the
1 Motivated by unhealthy conditions arising from economic pressure being exerted by
some railroad claim-settlement agents, and the incompetency or exorbitant fees of
some lawyers, in 1930 the Brotherhood established the department which, in essence, is
the issue in this case. The avowed purpose of the department is to aid the injured rail-
road employees and their families. The department consisted of sixteen lawyers selected
on a basis of their ability to adequately handle the nature of the cases generally involved
and their ability to procure large settlements in personal injury cases.
